1 00:00:05,171 --> 00:00:06,940 No, no no no no no. 2 00:00:11,945 --> 00:00:15,048 NARRATOR: Security footage of Flydubai Flight 981 3 00:00:15,115 --> 00:00:17,684 captures its final moments. 4 00:00:17,751 --> 00:00:19,619 Oh, it's diving hard. 5 00:00:19,686 --> 00:00:21,354 JOHN NANCE: The level of violence of the impact 6 00:00:21,421 --> 00:00:22,889 was catastrophic. 7 00:00:22,956 --> 00:00:26,493 NARRATOR: 62 people are killed in a fatal dive. 8 00:00:26,559 --> 00:00:29,229 Investigators soon discover the pilots 9 00:00:29,295 --> 00:00:31,364 had aborted two landings. 10 00:00:31,431 --> 00:00:33,500 We're going around. 11 00:00:33,566 --> 00:00:34,801 PHIL DERNER: A go-around is done just when 12 00:00:34,868 --> 00:00:36,736 conditions are not perfect. 13 00:00:36,803 --> 00:00:39,205 Did they say why they were going around the second time? 14 00:00:39,272 --> 00:00:40,640 They just said going around. 15 00:00:40,707 --> 00:00:41,908 Check your speed. 16 00:00:43,977 --> 00:00:45,512 CONTROLLER: The next thing I knew, the plane 17 00:00:45,578 --> 00:00:47,080 was diving towards the runway. 18 00:00:47,147 --> 00:00:49,749 Investigators needed to find out how the two 19 00:00:49,816 --> 00:00:51,351 go-arounds were different. 20 00:00:51,418 --> 00:00:54,254 One turns to disaster. 21 00:00:54,320 --> 00:00:56,055 Why? 22 00:00:56,122 --> 00:00:57,857 PILOT (ON RADIO): Mayday! 23 00:00:57,924 --> 00:00:58,758 Mayday! 24 00:01:02,328 --> 00:01:04,330 Go up! 25 00:01:21,648 --> 00:01:24,451 NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 closes 26 00:01:24,517 --> 00:01:26,753 in on Rostov-on-Don International 27 00:01:26,820 --> 00:01:28,621 Airport in Southwest Russia. 28 00:01:31,858 --> 00:01:36,763 Rostov tower, Skydubao 981, we're at 2,600 feet. 29 00:01:36,830 --> 00:01:40,300 2,300 feet is our next target altitude. 30 00:01:40,366 --> 00:01:44,637 NARRATOR: 11 miles out, Captain Aristos Sokratous and First 31 00:01:44,704 --> 00:01:49,476 Officer Alejandro Alava Cruz prepare the Boeing 737-800 32 00:01:49,542 --> 00:01:50,844 for touchdown. 33 00:01:53,112 --> 00:01:55,215 PHIL DERNER: Both pilots had a pretty good amount of flying 34 00:01:55,281 --> 00:01:57,817 hours in the 737, specifically. 35 00:01:57,884 --> 00:02:01,488 These were experienced pilots. 36 00:02:01,554 --> 00:02:04,491 CONTROLLER: Flight 981, Rostov Tower. 37 00:02:04,557 --> 00:02:06,659 Wind, 240 degrees. 38 00:02:06,726 --> 00:02:08,328 Gusts, 30 knots. 39 00:02:08,394 --> 00:02:12,065 You're cleared to land on Runway 22. 40 00:02:12,131 --> 00:02:13,800 NARRATOR: The controller reports the weather 41 00:02:13,867 --> 00:02:17,337 conditions at the airport. 42 00:02:17,403 --> 00:02:20,006 Thick clouds cover Rostov-on-Don. 43 00:02:20,073 --> 00:02:23,142 High winds are battering the runways. 44 00:02:23,209 --> 00:02:28,181 The weather in Rostov at that time was pretty low 45 00:02:28,248 --> 00:02:30,917 cloud with wind gusts. 46 00:02:30,984 --> 00:02:34,854 It was typical for that time of year for Rostov. 47 00:02:34,921 --> 00:02:38,658 If you look at the geography, with the sea and the hills 48 00:02:38,725 --> 00:02:42,428 around it, then yes, you can expect some challenges. 49 00:02:42,495 --> 00:02:46,432 NARRATOR: Flydubai Flight 981 departed Dubai International 50 00:02:46,499 --> 00:02:49,302 Airport at 10.37 PM. 51 00:02:49,369 --> 00:02:55,208 It's a four hour flight Northwest to Rostov-on-Don. 52 00:02:55,275 --> 00:03:00,179 It's a bumpy ride for the 55 passengers on board. 53 00:03:00,246 --> 00:03:02,849 The flight is expected to land in minutes. 54 00:03:06,085 --> 00:03:08,154 150 knots. 55 00:03:08,221 --> 00:03:11,558 NARRATOR: Eight miles out, the pilots reduce speed as they 56 00:03:11,624 --> 00:03:14,727 begin the final descent. 57 00:03:14,794 --> 00:03:16,696 PHIL DERNER: On approach, pilots know exactly 58 00:03:16,763 --> 00:03:18,031 what the airplane is doing. 59 00:03:18,097 --> 00:03:20,533 They know the conditions that they're flying in. 60 00:03:20,600 --> 00:03:21,901 Flaps 30. 61 00:03:21,968 --> 00:03:23,570 Flaps 30. 62 00:03:23,636 --> 00:03:25,838 PHIL DERNER: They're going to drop the flaps bit by bit, when 63 00:03:25,905 --> 00:03:27,574 to drop their landing gear. 64 00:03:27,640 --> 00:03:30,843 It's a very gradual process. 65 00:03:30,910 --> 00:03:34,314 It should be a bit bumpy and then later it should be calm. 66 00:03:34,380 --> 00:03:36,916 NARRATOR: The pilots expect turbulence on approach, 67 00:03:36,983 --> 00:03:42,989 but anticipate a smooth landing, The runway 68 00:03:43,056 --> 00:03:47,260 is just four miles away, but there's a threat ahead. 69 00:03:47,327 --> 00:03:48,227 AUTOMATED VOICE: Go around. 70 00:03:48,294 --> 00:03:50,263 Wind shear ahead. 71 00:03:50,330 --> 00:03:54,400 NARRATOR: The onboard radar has detected dangerous winds. 72 00:03:54,467 --> 00:03:55,501 AUTOMATED VOICE: Wind shear ahead. 73 00:03:55,568 --> 00:03:57,437 Wind shear ahead. 74 00:03:57,503 --> 00:04:01,441 NARRATOR: Wind shear is a rapid change in direction and speed 75 00:04:01,507 --> 00:04:03,109 of wind. 76 00:04:03,176 --> 00:04:06,846 If a pilot experiences a strong headwind that suddenly changes 77 00:04:06,913 --> 00:04:09,716 to a tailwind, the aircraft might not 78 00:04:09,782 --> 00:04:12,452 have enough lift to remain airborne, especially 79 00:04:12,518 --> 00:04:14,253 at low altitude. 80 00:04:14,320 --> 00:04:17,256 The wind shear alert is built into the aircraft's avionics 81 00:04:17,323 --> 00:04:20,026 to tell you you're going into wind currents 82 00:04:20,093 --> 00:04:21,961 that could be problematic. 83 00:04:22,028 --> 00:04:23,296 AUTOMATED VOICE: Wind shear ahead. 84 00:04:23,363 --> 00:04:25,031 Wind shear, go-around. 85 00:04:25,098 --> 00:04:27,934 NARRATOR: Just 1,000 feet above the ground, 86 00:04:28,001 --> 00:04:30,937 landing at Rostov-on-Don becomes too risky. 87 00:04:34,440 --> 00:04:36,309 ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov Tower, this is 981. 88 00:04:36,376 --> 00:04:39,646 We are conducting a go-around due to wind shear. 89 00:04:39,712 --> 00:04:41,714 NARRATOR: The pilots abort their approach. 90 00:04:43,983 --> 00:04:46,586 Every pilot is prepared to make 91 00:04:46,653 --> 00:04:48,488 a go-around on every approach. 92 00:04:48,554 --> 00:04:51,891 It's something that pilots do off the top of their heads. 93 00:04:51,958 --> 00:04:54,927 There's no manual involved. 94 00:04:54,994 --> 00:04:56,896 PHIL DERNER: They have no limit to the amount of approaches 95 00:04:56,963 --> 00:04:58,931 that they can try as long as they have enough fuel. 96 00:04:58,998 --> 00:05:02,468 So why not go around and just try it again? 97 00:05:02,535 --> 00:05:05,171 Flight 981, copy. 98 00:05:05,238 --> 00:05:07,674 NARRATOR: Flight 981 is one of four 99 00:05:07,740 --> 00:05:09,942 incoming flights controllers are managing 100 00:05:10,009 --> 00:05:13,746 as high winds delay landings. 101 00:05:13,813 --> 00:05:18,351 Aeroflot 1166, be advised Skydubai 981 reports 102 00:05:18,418 --> 00:05:20,486 wind shear on landing. 103 00:05:20,553 --> 00:05:22,188 PHIL DERNER: The air traffic controller's workload 104 00:05:22,255 --> 00:05:24,190 was definitely increased in this environment, 105 00:05:24,257 --> 00:05:27,527 and they have to start juggling all of those cards in the air. 106 00:05:27,593 --> 00:05:31,864 NARRATOR: As Flight 981 climbs-- 107 00:05:31,931 --> 00:05:36,836 Aeroflot 1166, you're cleared to land on runway 22. 108 00:05:36,903 --> 00:05:39,872 NARRATOR: --an Aeroflot flight prepares to land. 109 00:05:43,710 --> 00:05:45,778 Captain Sokratous pays close attention 110 00:05:45,845 --> 00:05:47,814 to its communications. 111 00:05:47,880 --> 00:05:50,116 I want to see what this guy will do. 112 00:05:50,183 --> 00:05:51,384 PHIL DERNER: The crew, at this point, 113 00:05:51,451 --> 00:05:53,653 is hoping that the crews of other flights 114 00:05:53,720 --> 00:05:55,121 are able to give them some information 115 00:05:55,188 --> 00:05:56,989 that they might be able to use to make some decisions 116 00:05:57,056 --> 00:05:58,191 about what to do next. 117 00:06:00,760 --> 00:06:04,731 NARRATOR: That flight can't land at Rostov-on-Dov either. 118 00:06:04,797 --> 00:06:07,333 PILOT (ON RADIO): Aeroflot 1156. 119 00:06:07,400 --> 00:06:10,036 We're going around, due to wind shear. 120 00:06:10,103 --> 00:06:12,705 NARRATOR: The Aeroflot pilots also encounter 121 00:06:12,772 --> 00:06:15,074 wind shear on final approach. 122 00:06:15,141 --> 00:06:17,744 They're forced to abort. 123 00:06:17,810 --> 00:06:19,378 That kind of seals the deal. 124 00:06:19,445 --> 00:06:21,314 Flydubai is going to have to either wait 125 00:06:21,380 --> 00:06:25,351 or they're going to have to go to an alternate airport. 126 00:06:25,418 --> 00:06:28,020 NARRATOR: High over Rostov-on-Don, passengers 127 00:06:28,087 --> 00:06:29,989 on Flight 981 are restless. 128 00:06:32,658 --> 00:06:35,194 The pilots are holding at 15,000 feet, 129 00:06:35,261 --> 00:06:38,498 circling near the airport, waiting for a chance to land. 130 00:06:40,600 --> 00:06:42,602 PHIL DERNER: The pilots sit in a holding pattern, since they had 131 00:06:42,668 --> 00:06:45,605 enough fuel to be able to do so, to wait for weather conditions 132 00:06:45,671 --> 00:06:47,206 to improve. 133 00:06:47,273 --> 00:06:50,409 NARRATOR: Three other planes are also in a holding pattern. 134 00:06:50,476 --> 00:06:53,846 The storm pounding Rostov-on-Don isn't passing. 135 00:07:00,253 --> 00:07:02,388 PILOT (ON RADIO): Aeroflot 1166. 136 00:07:02,455 --> 00:07:03,856 We're diverting. 137 00:07:06,926 --> 00:07:08,094 CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Skydubai 981, 138 00:07:08,161 --> 00:07:10,129 for your information, previous traffic 139 00:07:10,196 --> 00:07:11,798 went to alternate airports. 140 00:07:11,864 --> 00:07:14,267 NARRATOR: All the other flights decide to divert 141 00:07:14,333 --> 00:07:16,269 to alternate airports instead. 142 00:07:19,705 --> 00:07:21,374 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The problem with diverting 143 00:07:21,440 --> 00:07:25,244 is that it's expensive and, yes, it's inconvenient. 144 00:07:25,311 --> 00:07:27,814 The passengers don't end up at their destination. 145 00:07:27,880 --> 00:07:29,816 They have to be put up in hotels. 146 00:07:29,882 --> 00:07:35,221 And with a low cost airline, it's the last thing it wants. 147 00:07:35,288 --> 00:07:36,956 NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous continues 148 00:07:37,023 --> 00:07:39,091 monitoring the weather radar. 149 00:07:39,158 --> 00:07:41,327 Finally, he spots a clearing. 150 00:07:41,394 --> 00:07:43,329 I think I'd like to give it a try. 151 00:07:43,396 --> 00:07:44,163 I agree. 152 00:07:44,230 --> 00:07:45,998 Let's try. 153 00:07:46,065 --> 00:07:47,667 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's not unusual for crews 154 00:07:47,733 --> 00:07:50,002 to take advantage if there happens 155 00:07:50,069 --> 00:07:52,338 to be a break in the weather pattern 156 00:07:52,405 --> 00:07:56,576 that provides safe conditions to land the aircraft. 157 00:07:56,642 --> 00:08:00,613 Skydubai 981 request descent for another approach. 158 00:08:00,680 --> 00:08:04,750 NARRATOR: 15,000 feet over Rostov-on-Don, the pilots 159 00:08:04,817 --> 00:08:06,352 again prepare to land. 160 00:08:08,988 --> 00:08:11,324 Skydubai 981, Rosoff Tower. 161 00:08:11,390 --> 00:08:13,392 You're cleared to land on runway 22. 162 00:08:15,428 --> 00:08:16,829 ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ (ON INTERCOM): 163 00:08:16,896 --> 00:08:18,764 Good evening, your first officer here. 164 00:08:18,831 --> 00:08:20,032 We will be learning shortly. 165 00:08:20,099 --> 00:08:24,203 Once again, we apologize for the delay. 166 00:08:24,270 --> 00:08:26,472 NARRATOR: 13 miles from runway 22, 167 00:08:26,539 --> 00:08:28,941 the pilots line up for a second approach. 168 00:08:32,044 --> 00:08:33,546 CONTROLLER: Be advised, low altitude head 169 00:08:33,613 --> 00:08:36,816 wind 53 knots, light icing. 170 00:08:36,883 --> 00:08:38,484 NARRATOR: Even though winds are strong, 171 00:08:38,551 --> 00:08:41,554 controllers aren't reporting wind shear at the runway. 172 00:08:46,058 --> 00:08:47,226 Flaps 30. 173 00:08:47,293 --> 00:08:49,161 Flaps 30. 174 00:08:49,228 --> 00:08:51,030 NARRATOR: But as they approach, they soon 175 00:08:51,097 --> 00:08:54,500 realize something's not right. 176 00:08:54,567 --> 00:08:55,401 Check your speed. 177 00:09:00,640 --> 00:09:01,407 OK. 178 00:09:01,474 --> 00:09:03,576 Go-around. 179 00:09:03,643 --> 00:09:06,579 NARRATOR: The pilots execute another go-around. 180 00:09:17,056 --> 00:09:17,990 Keep it at 15 degrees. 181 00:09:18,057 --> 00:09:19,158 Nose up. 182 00:09:19,225 --> 00:09:20,693 NARRATOR: Just 2,000 feet in the air, 183 00:09:20,760 --> 00:09:29,435 Captain Sokratous kratos is wrestling with the Boeing 737. 184 00:09:29,502 --> 00:09:30,903 Seconds later-- 185 00:09:37,743 --> 00:09:40,780 NARRATOR: --Flight 981 is diving straight at the runway. 186 00:09:48,454 --> 00:09:49,455 Oh, my god. 187 00:09:59,532 --> 00:10:00,800 NARRATOR: Fire and emergency crews 188 00:10:00,866 --> 00:10:02,601 rush to the end of Runway 22. 189 00:10:05,438 --> 00:10:06,806 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The aircraft punched 190 00:10:06,872 --> 00:10:10,609 a crater in the runway about a meter and a half deep, 191 00:10:10,676 --> 00:10:12,278 with wreckage-- 192 00:10:12,345 --> 00:10:16,382 wreckage thrown everywhere. 193 00:10:16,449 --> 00:10:22,288 NARRATOR: Firefighters battle the flames through the night, 194 00:10:22,355 --> 00:10:25,491 but there's no one to be rescued. 195 00:10:25,558 --> 00:10:29,829 All 62 people on board Flight 981 are killed in the crash. 196 00:10:33,232 --> 00:10:36,936 Grieving families and the world demand answers. 197 00:10:45,644 --> 00:10:47,646 NARRATOR: Hours after Flydubai Flight 198 00:10:47,713 --> 00:10:51,350 981 crashes on the runway at Rostov-on-Don, 199 00:10:51,417 --> 00:10:55,321 investigators from the IAC, the Interstate Aviation Committee, 200 00:10:55,388 --> 00:10:56,322 arrive on the scene. 201 00:10:59,492 --> 00:11:05,097 The IAC is the lead air accident investigation agency, 202 00:11:05,164 --> 00:11:07,333 not just for Russia, but for several 203 00:11:07,400 --> 00:11:09,268 of the former Soviet states. 204 00:11:09,335 --> 00:11:13,339 NARRATOR: The IAC must find the cause for the horrific tragedy. 205 00:11:16,342 --> 00:11:17,176 OK. 206 00:11:17,243 --> 00:11:19,278 That's great. 207 00:11:19,345 --> 00:11:21,547 That belongs over here. 208 00:11:21,614 --> 00:11:23,749 NARRATOR: Wreckage from Flight 981 209 00:11:23,816 --> 00:11:27,853 is laid out in a nearby hangar for closer inspection. 210 00:11:27,920 --> 00:11:29,855 A team from the United Arab Emirates 211 00:11:29,922 --> 00:11:32,391 assists in the investigation. 212 00:11:32,458 --> 00:11:37,696 So how fast did the plane hit the ground? 213 00:11:45,171 --> 00:11:46,872 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The size of the debris 214 00:11:46,939 --> 00:11:48,908 would tell whether it was a high speed impact, whether it 215 00:11:48,974 --> 00:11:50,309 was a low speed impact. 216 00:11:50,376 --> 00:11:53,979 There are clues in the pieces of wreckage. 217 00:11:54,046 --> 00:11:56,782 There's not much left of it. 218 00:12:00,286 --> 00:12:02,221 GERRY SOEJATMAN: It was all small pieces. 219 00:12:02,288 --> 00:12:06,392 It describes a very high speed and violent impact 220 00:12:06,459 --> 00:12:07,293 with the ground. 221 00:12:10,329 --> 00:12:12,398 it makes us question what really happened. 222 00:12:16,235 --> 00:12:17,069 Let's see it. 223 00:12:19,538 --> 00:12:20,940 NARRATOR: Investigators wonder how 224 00:12:21,006 --> 00:12:23,342 the plane could have gathered so much speed 225 00:12:23,409 --> 00:12:25,978 during an attempted landing. 226 00:12:26,045 --> 00:12:27,613 Oh, it's diving hard. 227 00:12:27,680 --> 00:12:30,683 NARRATOR: Security footage gives them a look at the last moments 228 00:12:30,749 --> 00:12:33,185 of Flight 981. 229 00:12:38,591 --> 00:12:42,328 Flight 981's angle of descent leads investigators 230 00:12:42,394 --> 00:12:44,797 to wonder if the pilots were having problems 231 00:12:44,864 --> 00:12:46,098 controlling their plane. 232 00:12:46,165 --> 00:12:49,034 Maybe it's their flight controls. 233 00:12:49,101 --> 00:12:51,437 Mm-hmm. 234 00:12:51,504 --> 00:12:53,272 Never I've seen it before. 235 00:12:53,339 --> 00:12:55,975 NARRATOR: Boeing 737 flight controls 236 00:12:56,041 --> 00:12:58,177 have a problematic history. 237 00:13:02,348 --> 00:13:04,884 March 3, 1991-- 238 00:13:04,950 --> 00:13:08,387 United Airlines Flight 585 banks hard right 239 00:13:08,454 --> 00:13:13,726 and crashes while attempting to land, killing all on board. 240 00:13:13,792 --> 00:13:16,295 Three years later, it happens again. 241 00:13:16,362 --> 00:13:20,966 US Air Flight 427 rolls left and crashes near Pittsburgh. 242 00:13:22,902 --> 00:13:24,236 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Investigators 243 00:13:24,303 --> 00:13:26,906 were tearing their hair out trying to figure it out. 244 00:13:26,972 --> 00:13:30,075 NARRATOR: Two years passed without incident. 245 00:13:30,142 --> 00:13:34,413 Then, while on approach to land, the pilots of Eastwind Airlines 246 00:13:34,480 --> 00:13:37,750 Flight 517 lose control. 247 00:13:37,816 --> 00:13:41,220 This time, the pilots regain control of their plane and land 248 00:13:41,287 --> 00:13:43,122 safely in Richmond, Virginia. 249 00:13:46,892 --> 00:13:48,260 The plane is intact. 250 00:13:48,327 --> 00:13:51,931 Investigators get their best lead yet. 251 00:13:51,997 --> 00:13:53,933 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: After a five year investigation, 252 00:13:53,999 --> 00:13:56,202 the National Transportation Safety Board 253 00:13:56,268 --> 00:14:00,606 concluded that a power unit in the rudder 254 00:14:00,673 --> 00:14:04,944 had been responsible for what's called a rudder hard over. 255 00:14:05,010 --> 00:14:07,947 The rudder had moved to one side, 256 00:14:08,013 --> 00:14:12,117 and that caused the aircraft to roll over 257 00:14:12,184 --> 00:14:14,386 and then dive into the ground. 258 00:14:14,453 --> 00:14:17,189 NARRATOR: Movements of rudder and other control surfaces 259 00:14:17,256 --> 00:14:22,094 occur when pilots push their rudder pedal or pull the yoke. 260 00:14:22,161 --> 00:14:25,531 Power control units turn those commands into actual movements 261 00:14:25,598 --> 00:14:27,766 of the control surfaces. 262 00:14:27,833 --> 00:14:30,035 It's similar to the power steering on a car. 263 00:14:34,373 --> 00:14:35,975 Hey, there. 264 00:14:36,041 --> 00:14:37,610 Did you recover the PCUs? 265 00:14:37,676 --> 00:14:40,746 NARRATOR: Investigators want to know if any of Flight 266 00:14:40,813 --> 00:14:44,883 981's control units failed. 267 00:14:44,950 --> 00:14:46,285 Yep, they're here. 268 00:14:46,352 --> 00:14:46,986 Great. 269 00:14:47,052 --> 00:14:48,320 We need to test them. 270 00:14:48,387 --> 00:14:50,990 NARRATOR: Much of the Boeing 737 was destroyed 271 00:14:51,056 --> 00:14:52,558 during high speed impact. 272 00:14:52,625 --> 00:14:55,928 But two of the power control units have survived. 273 00:14:55,995 --> 00:15:00,099 They could provide crucial information. 274 00:15:00,165 --> 00:15:02,501 JOHN NANCE: PCUs are the heart and soul of the flight 275 00:15:02,568 --> 00:15:04,069 controls of the airplane. 276 00:15:04,136 --> 00:15:05,604 And one of the first questions if you have an airplane that 277 00:15:05,671 --> 00:15:08,340 came screaming out of the sky they had a 50 degree angle 278 00:15:08,407 --> 00:15:12,077 is did we have a PCU problem in the flight controls. 279 00:15:14,413 --> 00:15:15,814 NARRATOR: Investigators carefully 280 00:15:15,881 --> 00:15:20,286 examine the PCUs of Flight 981. 281 00:15:20,352 --> 00:15:23,155 They look for signs of a malfunction. 282 00:15:30,929 --> 00:15:33,432 Nothing wrong with the PCUs. 283 00:15:33,499 --> 00:15:36,001 JOHN NANCE: They were extensively examined and found 284 00:15:36,068 --> 00:15:39,338 to have had absolutely no connection to what brought 285 00:15:39,405 --> 00:15:41,507 this airplane out of the sky. 286 00:15:41,573 --> 00:15:44,343 NARRATOR: With flight control issues ruled out, 287 00:15:44,410 --> 00:15:48,547 the team turns to the controller for insight. 288 00:15:48,614 --> 00:15:50,883 Take me through what you saw. 289 00:15:50,949 --> 00:15:52,384 They were on final approach. 290 00:15:56,455 --> 00:15:58,223 CONTROLLER (ON RADIO): Flight 081, Rostov Tower. 291 00:15:58,290 --> 00:16:00,225 You're clear to land on runway 22. 292 00:16:03,529 --> 00:16:05,631 Then they aborted their first attempt to land. 293 00:16:08,133 --> 00:16:10,703 They reported wind shear. 294 00:16:10,769 --> 00:16:13,205 ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov Tower, this is 981. 295 00:16:13,272 --> 00:16:16,742 We're conducting a go-around due to wind shear. 296 00:16:16,809 --> 00:16:22,047 Skydubai 981, make holding pattern at your convenience. 297 00:16:22,114 --> 00:16:24,750 They climbed and began holding. 298 00:16:24,817 --> 00:16:26,919 How long were they holding? 299 00:16:26,985 --> 00:16:28,420 For a long time. 300 00:16:28,487 --> 00:16:30,389 NARRATOR: Investigators learn that the pilots 301 00:16:30,456 --> 00:16:32,691 held for almost two hours waiting 302 00:16:32,758 --> 00:16:33,992 for the weather to improve. 303 00:16:36,662 --> 00:16:41,033 Skydubai 981, request descent for another approach. 304 00:16:41,100 --> 00:16:43,268 CONTROLLER: Then they asked to land. 305 00:16:43,335 --> 00:16:45,371 NARRATOR: But something went wrong when the pilots 306 00:16:45,437 --> 00:16:48,273 made their second approach. 307 00:16:48,340 --> 00:16:51,176 ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Rostov Tower, this is Skydubai 981. 308 00:16:51,243 --> 00:16:53,912 We're going around. 309 00:16:53,979 --> 00:16:56,949 Did they say why they were going around the second time? 310 00:16:57,015 --> 00:16:58,217 No. 311 00:16:58,283 --> 00:17:01,854 They just said going around, that's all. 312 00:17:01,920 --> 00:17:04,523 The next thing I knew, the plane was diving towards the runway. 313 00:17:10,662 --> 00:17:13,432 Did they report any problems with the plane? 314 00:17:13,499 --> 00:17:15,801 No, nothing. 315 00:17:15,868 --> 00:17:18,070 NARRATOR: IAC investigators still 316 00:17:18,137 --> 00:17:21,774 can't explain why Flight 981 suddenly banked 317 00:17:21,840 --> 00:17:24,810 and then dived into runway 22. 318 00:17:24,877 --> 00:17:27,246 Something had gone wrong on the second go-around, 319 00:17:27,312 --> 00:17:29,048 but investigators didn't know what. 320 00:17:29,114 --> 00:17:31,283 Was there a problem with the airplane? 321 00:17:31,350 --> 00:17:33,152 Did the pilots make a mistake? 322 00:17:33,218 --> 00:17:34,553 There was no knowing it yet. 323 00:17:41,527 --> 00:17:42,828 OK. 324 00:17:42,895 --> 00:17:47,299 Two go-arounds, one turns to disaster. 325 00:17:47,366 --> 00:17:48,500 Why? 326 00:17:48,567 --> 00:17:49,902 Let's take a look at the first one. 327 00:17:49,968 --> 00:17:52,738 NARRATOR: Investigators turn to FDR data 328 00:17:52,805 --> 00:17:55,541 to better understand why Flydubai Flight 329 00:17:55,607 --> 00:17:59,378 981 performed one successful go-around 330 00:17:59,445 --> 00:18:01,313 but crashed during the second. 331 00:18:01,380 --> 00:18:04,016 Investigators need to figure out how the two go-arounds 332 00:18:04,082 --> 00:18:06,185 were different from each other. 333 00:18:06,251 --> 00:18:07,319 Zoom in a bit. 334 00:18:11,957 --> 00:18:13,559 Look. 335 00:18:13,625 --> 00:18:15,227 NARRATOR: They confirm the pilots 336 00:18:15,294 --> 00:18:20,766 reacted to a wind shear alarm during the first approach. 337 00:18:20,833 --> 00:18:22,901 And how did they respond? 338 00:18:22,968 --> 00:18:32,444 Thruster jumps up to 102. 339 00:18:32,511 --> 00:18:33,946 So he applied max power. 340 00:18:34,012 --> 00:18:34,680 Mm-hmm. 341 00:18:34,746 --> 00:18:36,515 What about the flaps? 342 00:18:36,582 --> 00:18:42,754 Flaps at 30, and gear remained down. 343 00:18:50,696 --> 00:18:52,231 Textbook wind shear go-around. 344 00:18:52,297 --> 00:18:53,966 Yeah. 345 00:18:54,032 --> 00:18:55,801 If a pilot encounters wind shear, 346 00:18:55,868 --> 00:18:57,803 he'll typically perform a-- what's called 347 00:18:57,870 --> 00:19:00,272 a wind shear escape maneuver. 348 00:19:00,339 --> 00:19:03,475 And that involves increasing the engine power to a maximum. 349 00:19:03,542 --> 00:19:04,810 You leave the flaps down. 350 00:19:04,877 --> 00:19:06,812 You leave the gear down. 351 00:19:06,879 --> 00:19:08,413 AUTOMATED VOICE: Wind shear ahead. 352 00:19:08,480 --> 00:19:10,949 Wind shear, go-around. 353 00:19:11,016 --> 00:19:13,585 PHIL DERNER: The first go round was pretty routine. 354 00:19:13,652 --> 00:19:14,953 They responded appropriately. 355 00:19:15,020 --> 00:19:17,055 They did exactly what they should have done. 356 00:19:21,393 --> 00:19:24,997 This is the second go-around. 357 00:19:25,063 --> 00:19:27,666 NARRATOR: Investigators analyze the second attempt 358 00:19:27,733 --> 00:19:32,304 at landing, focusing in on the last moments before the crash. 359 00:19:32,371 --> 00:19:36,508 Now, did they get another wind shear warning the second time? 360 00:19:36,575 --> 00:19:37,743 No, nothing. 361 00:19:45,050 --> 00:19:46,318 Look. 362 00:19:46,385 --> 00:19:51,823 There's a leap in air speed, from 153 to 176 in seconds. 363 00:19:51,890 --> 00:19:53,425 NARRATOR: 10 seconds before the pilots 364 00:19:53,492 --> 00:19:57,296 abort, a sudden increase in the plane's airspeed was recorded. 365 00:19:57,362 --> 00:20:02,367 Investigators saw the airspeed fluctuating for more than 20 366 00:20:02,434 --> 00:20:04,536 knots within a few seconds. 367 00:20:04,603 --> 00:20:06,371 It's a pretty strong gust of wind. 368 00:20:06,438 --> 00:20:10,042 Now, they can see that on the flight data recorder. 369 00:20:10,108 --> 00:20:12,878 NARRATOR: Investigators determined that a strong gust 370 00:20:12,945 --> 00:20:16,048 of wind struck the plane. 371 00:20:16,114 --> 00:20:18,050 JOHN NANCE: You can feel the wind increase 372 00:20:18,116 --> 00:20:19,518 on the nose of the airplane. 373 00:20:19,585 --> 00:20:21,853 It's probably also moving the airplane a little bit 374 00:20:21,920 --> 00:20:23,055 left to right. 375 00:20:23,121 --> 00:20:27,159 It's not a pleasant position to be in. 376 00:20:27,225 --> 00:20:28,694 How did the pilots respond this time? 377 00:20:28,760 --> 00:20:29,795 Let me see. 378 00:20:32,798 --> 00:20:35,367 They added max power. 379 00:20:35,434 --> 00:20:36,201 OK. 380 00:20:36,268 --> 00:20:37,636 Go around. 381 00:20:43,442 --> 00:20:46,244 And what about the flaps and landing gear? 382 00:20:46,311 --> 00:20:46,912 Hmm. 383 00:20:46,979 --> 00:20:50,849 Flaps are retracted. 384 00:20:50,916 --> 00:20:53,385 Gear, retracted. 385 00:20:55,621 --> 00:20:58,423 NARRATOR: The data reveals that on the second go-around 386 00:20:58,490 --> 00:21:02,027 the pilots performed a different procedure. 387 00:21:02,094 --> 00:21:03,095 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: They didn't 388 00:21:03,161 --> 00:21:04,930 fly the wind shear escape maneuver 389 00:21:04,997 --> 00:21:06,598 during the second go-around. 390 00:21:06,665 --> 00:21:11,737 Well, it looks like they were doing a standard go-around. 391 00:21:11,803 --> 00:21:13,071 NARRATOR: On a standard go-around, 392 00:21:13,138 --> 00:21:17,676 the flaps and landing gear are retracted. 393 00:21:17,743 --> 00:21:20,512 Except they did it at max power. 394 00:21:20,579 --> 00:21:22,514 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Given how streamlined the aircraft is 395 00:21:22,581 --> 00:21:26,418 with the landing gear up and the flaps largely retracted, 396 00:21:26,485 --> 00:21:30,188 the use of maximum power is very much overkill. 397 00:21:30,255 --> 00:21:33,925 NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that on the second attempt 398 00:21:33,992 --> 00:21:36,962 the crew flew a hybrid of two procedures. 399 00:21:40,599 --> 00:21:43,301 They used the power of a wind shear escape maneuver 400 00:21:43,368 --> 00:21:47,139 with the gear and flap settings of a traditional go-around. 401 00:21:53,145 --> 00:21:57,416 So what would that do to the plane? 402 00:21:57,482 --> 00:21:59,518 We need to take a look at all the factors at play. 403 00:22:05,624 --> 00:22:08,160 They were holding on for nearly two hours. 404 00:22:08,226 --> 00:22:13,265 That's four tons of fuel they burned. 405 00:22:13,331 --> 00:22:16,068 NARRATOR: The weight of the Boeing 737 406 00:22:16,134 --> 00:22:20,005 is a critical factor in the plane's performance. 407 00:22:20,072 --> 00:22:21,406 Adding the weight of the plane-- 408 00:22:25,911 --> 00:22:28,513 total weight, that's 54 tons. 409 00:22:32,217 --> 00:22:33,251 That's a light plane. 410 00:22:33,318 --> 00:22:34,152 Yeah. 411 00:22:36,555 --> 00:22:38,023 At this weight, you know, the crew would 412 00:22:38,090 --> 00:22:40,292 feel a faster acceleration. 413 00:22:45,764 --> 00:22:50,602 Max power, no drag from flaps or landing gear, low weight. 414 00:22:54,606 --> 00:22:58,844 This plane could have been accelerating dangerously fast. 415 00:22:58,910 --> 00:23:01,980 This is really an accelerated situation. 416 00:23:02,047 --> 00:23:03,615 This is a very powerful airplane doing 417 00:23:03,682 --> 00:23:07,385 something that feels like you just went into afterburner. 418 00:23:07,452 --> 00:23:09,054 How much quicker did this plane pick up 419 00:23:09,121 --> 00:23:12,457 speed on the second go-around? 420 00:23:16,528 --> 00:23:20,198 We need to do modeling on this. 421 00:23:20,265 --> 00:23:22,567 It was really incumbent upon the investigators 422 00:23:22,634 --> 00:23:27,572 to look further into the question of the acceleration. 423 00:23:27,639 --> 00:23:30,709 NARRATOR: Investigators turn to computer modeling 424 00:23:30,776 --> 00:23:32,644 to answer a crucial question. 425 00:23:32,711 --> 00:23:34,913 Here's all the data for the first and second go-around. 426 00:23:34,980 --> 00:23:36,414 Yeah. 427 00:23:36,481 --> 00:23:38,850 NARRATOR: How did the rate of acceleration 428 00:23:38,917 --> 00:23:41,086 differ at the start of the two attempts? 429 00:23:47,325 --> 00:23:53,865 First go-around, speed increased by 17 knots. 430 00:23:53,932 --> 00:23:55,000 And the second? 431 00:24:02,007 --> 00:24:07,679 Second go-around, 25 knot increase. 432 00:24:07,746 --> 00:24:09,915 That's a difference of 8 knots between the two go-arounds. 433 00:24:09,981 --> 00:24:10,849 Mm-hmm. 434 00:24:10,916 --> 00:24:12,450 Yeah. 435 00:24:12,517 --> 00:24:14,553 JOHN NANCE: It was a key part of the findings when they realized 436 00:24:14,619 --> 00:24:18,390 that over 40% difference existed between the acceleration 437 00:24:18,456 --> 00:24:22,093 from the first go-around to the second go-around. 438 00:24:22,160 --> 00:24:24,262 NARRATOR: Could the increase in acceleration have 439 00:24:24,329 --> 00:24:27,632 affected the pilots themselves? 440 00:24:27,699 --> 00:24:31,036 They calculate the impact of the second go-around. 441 00:24:36,508 --> 00:24:37,709 Wow. 442 00:24:37,776 --> 00:24:41,479 Look at the backward force experienced by the pilot. 443 00:24:41,546 --> 00:24:44,716 That faster acceleration on the second go-around would have 444 00:24:44,783 --> 00:24:46,952 pushed him back into the seat. 445 00:24:47,018 --> 00:24:49,621 NARRATOR: The team also examines the impact 446 00:24:49,688 --> 00:24:51,323 of vertical acceleration. 447 00:24:56,795 --> 00:24:59,397 The g-force would have lifted the pilots upwards. 448 00:25:01,700 --> 00:25:04,302 BRADEN MCGRATH: The pilot would have felt a slight unwaging. 449 00:25:04,369 --> 00:25:06,471 He would come up out of the seat. 450 00:25:06,538 --> 00:25:10,275 So sudden acceleration like this, 451 00:25:10,342 --> 00:25:15,413 both horizontal and vertical-- 452 00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:18,149 that'll play tricks on your mind. 453 00:25:18,216 --> 00:25:20,685 NARRATOR: Were Captain Sokratous's senses 454 00:25:20,752 --> 00:25:22,687 his worst enemy? 455 00:25:22,754 --> 00:25:24,656 Maybe he experienced a somatogravic illusion. 456 00:25:29,027 --> 00:25:30,328 Check your speed. 457 00:25:32,430 --> 00:25:32,998 OK. 458 00:25:33,064 --> 00:25:34,432 Go around. 459 00:25:34,499 --> 00:25:36,801 NARRATOR: A somatogravic illusion is a dangerous form 460 00:25:36,868 --> 00:25:39,537 of spatial disorientation. 461 00:25:39,604 --> 00:25:42,607 When a plane accelerates quickly with no visual reference 462 00:25:42,674 --> 00:25:45,710 of the horizon, the gravitational forces 463 00:25:45,777 --> 00:25:49,347 cause a pitch up illusion in the inner ear. 464 00:25:49,414 --> 00:25:52,350 The little hairs in the inner ear bend backwards, 465 00:25:52,417 --> 00:25:57,455 tricking the brain into thinking the head is tilting up. 466 00:25:57,522 --> 00:25:59,124 Well, you might be going level. 467 00:25:59,190 --> 00:26:01,159 But if you cannot see outside, that 468 00:26:01,226 --> 00:26:05,363 sensation on your vestibular system is overwhelming. 469 00:26:05,430 --> 00:26:08,900 And, you know, you would really feel that you're climbing up. 470 00:26:08,967 --> 00:26:10,735 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: A somatogravic graphic illusion 471 00:26:10,802 --> 00:26:14,239 is one of the most lethal traps in aviation. 472 00:26:14,306 --> 00:26:16,908 Keep the nose up 15 degrees. 473 00:26:16,975 --> 00:26:19,411 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's an extremely convincing illusion. 474 00:26:27,152 --> 00:26:29,988 What was the actual pitch of the plane after it accelerated 475 00:26:30,055 --> 00:26:33,091 during the second go-around? 476 00:26:33,158 --> 00:26:36,828 Almost 20 seconds after the actual pitch 477 00:26:36,895 --> 00:26:41,232 was 8.8 degrees nose up. 478 00:26:41,299 --> 00:26:43,068 NARRATOR: Investigators look for evidence 479 00:26:43,134 --> 00:26:46,404 that the pilots of Flight 981 became severely 480 00:26:46,471 --> 00:26:47,906 disoriented in the dark. 481 00:26:50,742 --> 00:26:51,843 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: If you imagine 482 00:26:51,910 --> 00:26:54,512 that this glass of water represents 483 00:26:54,579 --> 00:26:56,348 the fluid in your ear-- 484 00:26:56,414 --> 00:26:59,117 if you accelerated this along a smooth surface, 485 00:26:59,184 --> 00:27:02,454 the water would be pushed up against the back of the glass 486 00:27:02,520 --> 00:27:05,023 very much like this. 487 00:27:05,090 --> 00:27:08,460 In other words, it's the same effect as if you'd 488 00:27:08,526 --> 00:27:11,162 simply tilted the glass. 489 00:27:11,229 --> 00:27:15,367 If you take visual information away, what tends to happen 490 00:27:15,433 --> 00:27:19,204 is that the pilot forgets about the acceleration 491 00:27:19,270 --> 00:27:24,876 and assumes that everything is feeling is due to the pitch. 492 00:27:24,943 --> 00:27:28,279 And what was the pilot's perceived pitch? 493 00:27:28,346 --> 00:27:30,882 BRADEN MCGRATH: Combining the horizontal and vertical 494 00:27:30,949 --> 00:27:33,952 acceleration experienced by the pilot, 495 00:27:34,019 --> 00:27:38,156 we can calculate the pH that is perceived by the pilot. 496 00:27:38,223 --> 00:27:40,725 This is called the illusionary pitch. 497 00:27:40,792 --> 00:27:46,231 Pilot's perceived pitch was 21.6 degrees. 498 00:27:46,297 --> 00:27:48,500 NARRATOR: They compare the plane's actual pitch 499 00:27:48,566 --> 00:27:54,139 to the pilot's illusionary pitch during the second go-around. 500 00:27:54,205 --> 00:27:58,543 10 seconds later, the plane is pitched up 3.9 degrees. 501 00:28:04,382 --> 00:28:18,696 And the pilot perceived it to be 26.7 degrees, nose up. 502 00:28:18,763 --> 00:28:19,664 Wow. 503 00:28:19,731 --> 00:28:20,999 That's a huge difference. 504 00:28:27,105 --> 00:28:29,441 This puts the captain into a situation 505 00:28:29,507 --> 00:28:31,676 that he potentially will be experiencing 506 00:28:31,743 --> 00:28:32,944 as a somatogravic illusion. 507 00:28:33,011 --> 00:28:34,946 The captain is feeling one thing, 508 00:28:35,013 --> 00:28:37,715 but the aircraft is doing something else. 509 00:28:37,782 --> 00:28:39,284 Get this. 510 00:28:39,350 --> 00:28:48,460 Near the end of the flight, the actual pitch is 7.6 degrees, 511 00:28:48,526 --> 00:28:54,265 and the perceived pitch becomes, well over 40. 512 00:28:54,332 --> 00:28:58,036 NARRATOR: Investigators discover three instances where there was 513 00:28:58,103 --> 00:29:00,972 a dramatic difference between the plane's actual and 514 00:29:01,039 --> 00:29:02,974 the pilot's perceived pitch. 515 00:29:05,210 --> 00:29:07,145 Keep it at 16 degrees, nose up. 516 00:29:07,212 --> 00:29:09,714 NARRATOR: It's evidence that the pilots may have 517 00:29:09,781 --> 00:29:11,950 experienced a somatogravic illusion 518 00:29:12,016 --> 00:29:15,253 during the second go-around. 519 00:29:15,320 --> 00:29:17,822 Could the feeling of the rapid acceleration 520 00:29:17,889 --> 00:29:21,159 have affected how the pilots flew the plane? 521 00:29:21,226 --> 00:29:24,896 They dig deeper into the flight data. 522 00:29:24,963 --> 00:29:28,399 When the captain push forward on the yoke-- 523 00:29:28,466 --> 00:29:30,568 He was trying to pitch the plane downward. 524 00:29:30,635 --> 00:29:34,506 That's what his senses were telling him to do. 525 00:29:34,572 --> 00:29:37,175 JOHN NANCE: The captain, responding more to his feelings 526 00:29:37,242 --> 00:29:39,310 than to what he was seeing on any instrumentation 527 00:29:39,377 --> 00:29:41,179 in front of him-- he decides that he needs 528 00:29:41,246 --> 00:29:43,781 to push the airplane forward and counteract 529 00:29:43,848 --> 00:29:45,150 this massive pitch up. 530 00:29:45,216 --> 00:29:48,853 He's trying to save them by pitching down. 531 00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:49,687 Wow. 532 00:29:49,754 --> 00:29:51,022 Check this out. 533 00:29:51,089 --> 00:29:55,260 He pushed the stabilizer trim down. 534 00:29:55,326 --> 00:29:58,596 NARRATOR: From the data, investigators see the captain 535 00:29:58,663 --> 00:30:00,465 didn't just push the yoke. 536 00:30:00,532 --> 00:30:02,467 Be careful! 537 00:30:02,534 --> 00:30:04,269 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: Captain applies the stabilized 538 00:30:04,335 --> 00:30:07,472 trim because he's pushing-- 539 00:30:07,539 --> 00:30:10,475 trying to push the nose of the aircraft down. 540 00:30:10,542 --> 00:30:11,543 But for how long? 541 00:30:16,548 --> 00:30:17,482 Yeah. 542 00:30:17,549 --> 00:30:21,619 He held the trim switch for 12 seconds. 543 00:30:21,686 --> 00:30:25,023 PHIL DERNER: Holding the switch for 12 seconds is unheard of. 544 00:30:25,089 --> 00:30:28,059 That should never be held for that amount of time. 545 00:30:28,126 --> 00:30:30,895 NARRATOR: The team discovers that instead of pitching 546 00:30:30,962 --> 00:30:33,965 the plane up to climb, the captain is pitching 547 00:30:34,032 --> 00:30:36,901 the plane towards the ground-- 548 00:30:36,968 --> 00:30:38,469 No, no, no, no, no, no, no. 549 00:30:38,536 --> 00:30:41,306 NARRATOR: --eventually putting the plane into a fatal dive. 550 00:30:44,475 --> 00:30:47,912 The sudden change in direction is jarring. 551 00:30:47,979 --> 00:30:49,347 GERRY SOEJATMAN: At that time you 552 00:30:49,414 --> 00:30:51,316 feel like you're in a roller coaster, you know, 553 00:30:51,382 --> 00:30:53,351 when you're coming up to the peak 554 00:30:53,418 --> 00:30:55,019 as you were diving at speed. 555 00:30:55,086 --> 00:30:57,655 It's similar to that sensation. 556 00:30:57,722 --> 00:31:00,091 NARRATOR: The pitch down has another disorienting 557 00:31:00,158 --> 00:31:03,494 effect on the pilot's senses. 558 00:31:03,561 --> 00:31:06,097 Pitching down of the aircraft would have caused both 559 00:31:06,164 --> 00:31:08,333 the captain and the first officer 560 00:31:08,399 --> 00:31:10,868 to experience a dramatic change in the g-forces. 561 00:31:10,935 --> 00:31:12,003 Oh, my god! 562 00:31:14,472 --> 00:31:16,941 That would increase the confusion in the cockpit 563 00:31:17,008 --> 00:31:19,410 as to what's going on. 564 00:31:19,477 --> 00:31:23,081 NARRATOR: Investigators conclude that the various g-forces 565 00:31:23,147 --> 00:31:25,783 on Captain Sokratous caused his complete 566 00:31:25,850 --> 00:31:29,087 spatial disorientation. 567 00:31:29,153 --> 00:31:30,622 GERRY SOEJATMAN: The captain pushing and pulling 568 00:31:30,688 --> 00:31:33,891 on the yoke, stomping on the rudder, in the dive, you know, 569 00:31:33,958 --> 00:31:35,627 that shows confusion. 570 00:31:35,693 --> 00:31:37,962 He's probably disorientated. 571 00:31:38,029 --> 00:31:39,297 Oh, my god! 572 00:31:39,364 --> 00:31:40,898 GERRY SOEJATMAN: You know, he's trying 573 00:31:40,965 --> 00:31:45,069 desperately to get out of that sensation that he's feeling. 574 00:31:45,136 --> 00:31:46,871 NARRATOR: But there's one question that 575 00:31:46,938 --> 00:31:49,207 still troubles investigators. 576 00:31:49,274 --> 00:31:53,544 Was the first officer feeling the illusion, as well? 577 00:31:53,611 --> 00:31:56,281 BRADEN MCGRATH: Even though the accelerations experienced 578 00:31:56,347 --> 00:32:02,453 by both pilots was the same, the perception of what is happening 579 00:32:02,520 --> 00:32:03,588 can differ. 580 00:32:03,655 --> 00:32:05,990 And that can be due to many different factors-- 581 00:32:06,057 --> 00:32:09,327 expectation, what are they looking at, 582 00:32:09,394 --> 00:32:12,063 their age, their experience. 583 00:32:12,130 --> 00:32:15,233 Start it at the second go-around, please. 584 00:32:15,300 --> 00:32:16,501 NARRATOR: The cockpit voice recorder 585 00:32:16,567 --> 00:32:19,003 could tell investigators if the first officer 586 00:32:19,070 --> 00:32:22,373 was also under the influence of the somatogravic illusion. 587 00:32:24,309 --> 00:32:25,109 ARISTOS SOKRATOUS: OK. 588 00:32:25,176 --> 00:32:26,210 Go around. 589 00:32:28,746 --> 00:32:29,647 Careful! 590 00:32:33,518 --> 00:32:36,921 No, no, no, no, no, no, no. 591 00:32:36,988 --> 00:32:39,190 Don't-- don't do that! 592 00:32:39,257 --> 00:32:41,526 He sees something wrong. 593 00:32:41,592 --> 00:32:42,360 No. 594 00:32:42,427 --> 00:32:43,027 Pull it! 595 00:32:43,094 --> 00:32:43,861 Pull it! 596 00:32:43,928 --> 00:32:45,163 Pull it! 597 00:32:45,229 --> 00:32:46,798 He's telling him to pull back the yoke. 598 00:32:46,864 --> 00:32:48,700 ALEJANDRO ALAVA CRUZ: Pull it! 599 00:32:48,766 --> 00:32:51,703 If he's feeling the same illusion as the captain, 600 00:32:51,769 --> 00:32:55,473 it sure doesn't seem like he was affected by it. 601 00:32:55,540 --> 00:32:57,542 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The first officer knew how much trouble 602 00:32:57,608 --> 00:32:59,944 the aircraft was in, knew the captain wasn't 603 00:33:00,011 --> 00:33:01,946 responding the way he should. 604 00:33:02,013 --> 00:33:03,848 Oh, my god! 605 00:33:08,953 --> 00:33:12,323 NARRATOR: Investigators are left wondering why the first officer 606 00:33:12,390 --> 00:33:13,791 didn't intervene. 607 00:33:17,795 --> 00:33:19,397 You look at this first office you're trying his best 608 00:33:19,464 --> 00:33:21,299 and wonder why didn't you just take control 609 00:33:21,366 --> 00:33:23,534 and say, I've got the airplane. 610 00:33:40,151 --> 00:33:43,454 He's been flying the 737-800 for nearly two years. 611 00:33:43,521 --> 00:33:44,889 He's fully certified. 612 00:33:44,956 --> 00:33:47,325 NARRATOR: Investigators look into the first officer's 613 00:33:47,392 --> 00:33:50,128 background to understand why he didn't take 614 00:33:50,194 --> 00:33:53,664 control of Flight 981 when he the captain 615 00:33:53,731 --> 00:33:56,601 was making grave mistakes. 616 00:33:56,667 --> 00:33:58,002 Look. 617 00:33:58,069 --> 00:34:01,439 His trainer wrote notes on his assessment, 618 00:34:01,506 --> 00:34:02,907 and this one is telling. 619 00:34:02,974 --> 00:34:05,476 NARRATOR: They find notes left by one of his flight 620 00:34:05,543 --> 00:34:07,478 instructors that alarm them. 621 00:34:07,545 --> 00:34:10,681 One thing that could have possibly saved this aircraft 622 00:34:10,748 --> 00:34:13,418 was discovered in a note that was left 623 00:34:13,484 --> 00:34:15,353 behind by a flight instructor. 624 00:34:15,420 --> 00:34:17,588 He needs to be a bit more assertive in what 625 00:34:17,655 --> 00:34:19,457 is needed from the captain. 626 00:34:19,524 --> 00:34:21,259 And it continues. 627 00:34:21,325 --> 00:34:23,161 Tell him what you want done, and do not 628 00:34:23,227 --> 00:34:25,463 wait for the captain to inquire with you 629 00:34:25,530 --> 00:34:27,765 or direct you in this regard. 630 00:34:30,768 --> 00:34:32,270 He's not the type to take control. 631 00:34:35,440 --> 00:34:36,674 No. Pull it! 632 00:34:36,741 --> 00:34:37,508 Pull it! 633 00:34:37,575 --> 00:34:38,376 Pull it! 634 00:34:38,443 --> 00:34:39,544 Pull it! 635 00:34:39,610 --> 00:34:40,845 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: A first officer 636 00:34:40,912 --> 00:34:43,314 could see that the captain was experiencing 637 00:34:43,381 --> 00:34:46,384 enormous problems trying to control the go-around. 638 00:34:46,451 --> 00:34:50,354 He really should have taken some decisive action and intervened. 639 00:34:50,421 --> 00:34:51,255 Oh, my god! 640 00:34:57,128 --> 00:34:59,397 I still don't understand something. 641 00:34:59,464 --> 00:35:03,501 Why did they try to land the plane in the first place? 642 00:35:03,568 --> 00:35:07,071 The big mystery was why was this crew so determined to land 643 00:35:07,138 --> 00:35:10,975 at Rostov-onDon when every other flight had already diverted. 644 00:35:11,042 --> 00:35:13,978 NARRATOR: A storm was pummeling Rostov-on-Don Airport, 645 00:35:14,045 --> 00:35:18,249 as Flight 981 circled above. 646 00:35:18,316 --> 00:35:23,221 Why didn't the pilots divert to another airport? 647 00:35:23,287 --> 00:35:26,991 Investigators look for answers in the cockpit voice recording. 648 00:35:29,160 --> 00:35:30,394 CONTROLLER (ON RECORDING): Skydubai 981, 649 00:35:30,461 --> 00:35:32,597 for your information, previous traffic 650 00:35:32,663 --> 00:35:35,099 went to alternate airports. 651 00:35:35,166 --> 00:35:37,602 Two other flights diverted? 652 00:35:37,668 --> 00:35:39,403 There's no need. 653 00:35:39,470 --> 00:35:42,206 I'm gonna keep flying. 654 00:35:42,273 --> 00:35:45,076 Investigators just couldn't understand 655 00:35:45,142 --> 00:35:48,779 why they wanted to fly in circles for almost two hours. 656 00:35:48,846 --> 00:35:49,881 ARISTOS SOKRATOUS (ON RECORDING): 657 00:35:49,947 --> 00:35:51,215 I'm gonna try this approach. 658 00:35:51,282 --> 00:35:54,285 And if I can't make it, we'll have a go-around. 659 00:35:54,352 --> 00:35:56,621 And I will head to Mineralyne Vody. 660 00:35:56,687 --> 00:35:57,855 OK? 661 00:35:57,922 --> 00:35:58,723 DISPATCHER (ON RECORDING): OK, Captain. 662 00:35:58,789 --> 00:35:59,624 Understood. 663 00:35:59,690 --> 00:36:00,791 Who is he talking to? 664 00:36:00,858 --> 00:36:02,360 The dispatcher in Dubai. 665 00:36:02,426 --> 00:36:04,061 NARRATOR: Investigators finally get 666 00:36:04,128 --> 00:36:06,264 an indication of the captain's rationale 667 00:36:06,330 --> 00:36:08,933 for attempting another landing. 668 00:36:09,000 --> 00:36:11,802 As the captain decides whether to divert, 669 00:36:11,869 --> 00:36:14,138 he contacts Flydubai's flight dispatcher 670 00:36:14,205 --> 00:36:16,040 in the United Arab Emirates. 671 00:36:16,107 --> 00:36:17,742 DISPATCHER (ON RADIO): We would like to recommend 672 00:36:17,808 --> 00:36:21,279 you hold max as possible. 673 00:36:21,345 --> 00:36:24,048 Dispatchers manage the entire fleet's operation 674 00:36:24,115 --> 00:36:26,150 for a specific airline. 675 00:36:26,217 --> 00:36:27,652 JOHN NANCE: The dispatcher and the captain 676 00:36:27,718 --> 00:36:30,821 are co-equally responsible for the safety of the flight. 677 00:36:30,888 --> 00:36:33,157 There is a very delicate dance that 678 00:36:33,224 --> 00:36:37,662 goes on between and among the dispatchers and the captains. 679 00:36:37,728 --> 00:36:41,999 The captain follows with the dispatchers recommendation. 680 00:36:42,066 --> 00:36:44,502 NARRATOR: Minutes turn to hours as the pilots 681 00:36:44,569 --> 00:36:46,504 wait for a chance to land. 682 00:36:46,571 --> 00:36:47,939 I don't know, man. 683 00:36:48,005 --> 00:36:49,473 If we divert, we're gonna exceed our flying hours. 684 00:36:54,579 --> 00:36:55,780 So what are you looking at? 685 00:36:55,846 --> 00:36:58,282 Maximum duty hours. 686 00:36:58,349 --> 00:37:01,953 He's calculating his duty hours. 687 00:37:02,019 --> 00:37:04,288 NARRATOR: Regulations limit how many hours pilots 688 00:37:04,355 --> 00:37:08,125 can fly during a duty period. 689 00:37:08,192 --> 00:37:11,128 Been in the air for 5 and 1/2 hours now. 690 00:37:11,195 --> 00:37:13,998 NARRATOR: The team learns that the pilots were concerned they 691 00:37:14,065 --> 00:37:16,767 might exceed their duty hours. 692 00:37:16,834 --> 00:37:18,536 Stop. 693 00:37:18,603 --> 00:37:19,437 Roll the map. 694 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:25,142 They've been flying for at least five hours. 695 00:37:25,209 --> 00:37:27,878 It'll take another hour to reach their alternate airport, 696 00:37:27,945 --> 00:37:29,280 wait out the storm. 697 00:37:29,347 --> 00:37:31,215 Then they still have to get back to Rostov-on-Don 698 00:37:31,282 --> 00:37:32,850 before returning to Dubai. 699 00:37:32,917 --> 00:37:35,853 Diverting would put them over their duty hours for the day. 700 00:37:35,920 --> 00:37:36,954 Right. 701 00:37:37,021 --> 00:37:38,556 Look. 702 00:37:38,623 --> 00:37:40,992 I think it'll be clear by the time we do this approach now. 703 00:37:41,058 --> 00:37:45,563 And even if we start now, I think we'll be good. 704 00:37:45,630 --> 00:37:47,565 We'll be good. 705 00:37:47,632 --> 00:37:49,233 OK. 706 00:37:49,300 --> 00:37:52,870 Is he landing because it's clear or because he 707 00:37:52,937 --> 00:37:55,306 wants to get on the ground? 708 00:37:55,373 --> 00:37:56,974 PHIL DERNER: The conversation in the flight deck 709 00:37:57,041 --> 00:38:00,244 before the second approach clearly showed that they 710 00:38:00,311 --> 00:38:02,079 weren't really thinking so much about the safety 711 00:38:02,146 --> 00:38:07,018 of the landing, just the fact that they wanted to land. 712 00:38:07,084 --> 00:38:08,753 I think I'd like to give it a try. 713 00:38:08,819 --> 00:38:09,587 I agree. 714 00:38:09,654 --> 00:38:11,088 Let's try. 715 00:38:11,155 --> 00:38:15,159 Stop the recording. 716 00:38:15,226 --> 00:38:18,496 So they decide to circle for two hours 717 00:38:18,562 --> 00:38:21,399 after a four hour flight in the middle of the night. 718 00:38:26,737 --> 00:38:29,874 NARRATOR: Did the long flight affect the pilot's ability 719 00:38:29,940 --> 00:38:32,243 to land the plane safely? 720 00:38:32,309 --> 00:38:34,612 Two hours of hold, six hours total time-- 721 00:38:34,679 --> 00:38:37,248 aren't we seeing a decline in the decision making 722 00:38:37,314 --> 00:38:39,016 capabilities because of fatigue? 723 00:38:39,083 --> 00:38:41,385 You tired? 724 00:38:41,452 --> 00:38:42,353 No. 725 00:38:47,525 --> 00:38:50,795 NARRATOR: As investigators break down Flight 981's journey 726 00:38:50,861 --> 00:38:53,397 from Dubai to Rostov-on-Don, they 727 00:38:53,464 --> 00:38:55,766 identify a glaring problem. 728 00:38:55,833 --> 00:38:58,769 They were actually in the air for more than six hours. 729 00:38:58,836 --> 00:39:02,640 It's almost 5:00 AM their time when they're landing. 730 00:39:02,707 --> 00:39:04,442 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: The circadian rhythm 731 00:39:04,508 --> 00:39:09,380 is the body's natural alignment with the day and night cycle. 732 00:39:09,447 --> 00:39:11,782 A quiet period is roughly for a four 733 00:39:11,849 --> 00:39:16,053 hour between 2:00 in the morning and 6:00 in the morning. 734 00:39:16,120 --> 00:39:19,824 That's the point at which your mental ability 735 00:39:19,890 --> 00:39:23,160 is pretty much at its lowest. 736 00:39:23,227 --> 00:39:24,829 I think I'd like to give it a try. 737 00:39:24,895 --> 00:39:25,763 I agree. 738 00:39:25,830 --> 00:39:28,265 Let's try. 739 00:39:28,332 --> 00:39:30,835 NARRATOR: Investigators determined the crew was 740 00:39:30,901 --> 00:39:33,003 suffering from operational fatigue 741 00:39:33,070 --> 00:39:35,072 as they launched their second approach. 742 00:39:37,408 --> 00:39:39,977 Good evening, your first officer here. 743 00:39:40,044 --> 00:39:41,345 We will be landing shortly. 744 00:39:41,412 --> 00:39:44,515 Once again, we apologize for the delay. 745 00:39:44,582 --> 00:39:46,517 NARRATOR: The decision to make a second attempt 746 00:39:46,584 --> 00:39:50,187 to land at Rostov-on-Don triggers a chain of events 747 00:39:50,254 --> 00:39:53,624 that ends in catastrophe. 748 00:39:53,691 --> 00:39:55,459 Check your speed. 749 00:39:55,526 --> 00:39:57,495 As the aircraft is hit by this sudden wind, 750 00:39:57,561 --> 00:40:02,633 the crew is forced into executing another go-around. 751 00:40:02,700 --> 00:40:03,768 OK, go around. 752 00:40:03,834 --> 00:40:06,370 And this time it was all going to go wrong. 753 00:40:06,437 --> 00:40:08,305 NARRATOR: Captain Sokratous executes 754 00:40:08,372 --> 00:40:12,810 a wind shear go-around, pushing the throttle to maximum power. 755 00:40:12,877 --> 00:40:15,646 The first officer performs a standard go-around, 756 00:40:15,713 --> 00:40:20,351 retracting the flaps and raising the landing gear. 757 00:40:20,417 --> 00:40:22,453 Both pilots were essentially flying two 758 00:40:22,520 --> 00:40:24,388 different airplanes from there. 759 00:40:24,455 --> 00:40:27,224 This blunder factors heavily into the catastrophe 760 00:40:27,291 --> 00:40:28,793 that followed. 761 00:40:28,859 --> 00:40:33,864 NARRATOR: Flight 981 climbs from Rostov-on-Don at high speed. 762 00:40:33,931 --> 00:40:36,333 When you're light on fuel and you put the maximum thrust, 763 00:40:36,400 --> 00:40:38,135 you will accelerate. 764 00:40:40,237 --> 00:40:41,505 DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW: It's what happened 765 00:40:41,572 --> 00:40:47,478 in the last few seconds that doomed Flight 981. 766 00:40:47,545 --> 00:40:49,413 Keep it at 15 degrees, nose up. 767 00:40:49,480 --> 00:40:51,749 NARRATOR: At this moment, Captain Sokratous 768 00:40:51,816 --> 00:40:53,918 fights an inner battle. 769 00:40:53,984 --> 00:40:57,254 Acceleration of the aircraft makes the captain feel as 770 00:40:57,321 --> 00:41:00,758 though the aircraft is pitching up a lot more 771 00:41:00,825 --> 00:41:02,393 than it actually is. 772 00:41:02,459 --> 00:41:04,061 NARRATOR: His spatial orientation 773 00:41:04,128 --> 00:41:07,565 deteriorates rapidly. 774 00:41:07,631 --> 00:41:09,667 JOHN NANCE: Your vestibular senses and your middle ear 775 00:41:09,733 --> 00:41:12,570 are all telling you the wrong thing. 776 00:41:12,636 --> 00:41:14,572 NARRATOR: The captain counters the pitch up 777 00:41:14,638 --> 00:41:16,907 feeling of a somatogravic illusion 778 00:41:16,974 --> 00:41:18,576 by pushing the yoke forward. 779 00:41:20,911 --> 00:41:24,415 The captain has lost touch with the reality of what's 780 00:41:24,481 --> 00:41:26,050 happening to the airplane. 781 00:41:26,116 --> 00:41:28,419 NARRATOR: Then, the final blow. 782 00:41:28,485 --> 00:41:30,754 The captain holds that stabilizer trim button 783 00:41:30,821 --> 00:41:33,958 down for about 12 seconds. 784 00:41:34,024 --> 00:41:37,294 With the sudden forcing of the aircraft's nose down 785 00:41:37,361 --> 00:41:40,598 and stabilizer trim, the aircraft 786 00:41:40,664 --> 00:41:46,237 transitions from a climb very suddenly into a dive. 787 00:41:46,303 --> 00:41:47,638 BRADEN MCGRATH: The aircraft is now 788 00:41:47,705 --> 00:41:49,974 in a very dangerous situation which the captain 789 00:41:50,040 --> 00:41:51,942 is unable to overcome. 790 00:41:52,009 --> 00:41:52,776 My god! 791 00:41:54,511 --> 00:41:56,480 JOHN NANCE: They're accelerating rapidly, 792 00:41:56,547 --> 00:42:00,050 and the first officer finally gets on the yoke 793 00:42:00,117 --> 00:42:01,285 and tries to pull. 794 00:42:01,352 --> 00:42:03,487 But the controls on the left side 795 00:42:03,554 --> 00:42:06,991 govern where the airplane is. 796 00:42:07,057 --> 00:42:11,495 And you get to a certain point, and there's no recovery. 797 00:42:11,562 --> 00:42:13,264 NARRATOR: Nose diving at full throttle 798 00:42:13,330 --> 00:42:15,499 towards the runway, Captain Sokratous 799 00:42:15,566 --> 00:42:18,168 is completely disoriented. 800 00:42:18,235 --> 00:42:20,804 When he adds rudder at the last moment, 801 00:42:20,871 --> 00:42:25,242 he's lost all awareness of how the plane is flying. 802 00:42:31,582 --> 00:42:34,785 The pilots in this case were conducting 803 00:42:34,852 --> 00:42:40,124 the flight very well right up until those last few moments. 804 00:42:40,190 --> 00:42:43,093 And then it all really just fell apart. 805 00:42:48,198 --> 00:42:52,336 NARRATOR: The IAC investigation into the crash of Flight 981 806 00:42:52,403 --> 00:42:55,839 is a landmark case of how spatial disorientation 807 00:42:55,906 --> 00:42:58,609 can end in disaster. 808 00:42:58,676 --> 00:43:00,177 GERRY SOEJATMAN: This accident is a wake up 809 00:43:00,244 --> 00:43:01,312 call for the industry. 810 00:43:01,378 --> 00:43:02,513 This is one of the accidents that 811 00:43:02,579 --> 00:43:05,215 pave the way into increased training 812 00:43:05,282 --> 00:43:08,385 in spatial disorientation. 813 00:43:08,452 --> 00:43:11,288 NARRATOR: In their final report, investigators 814 00:43:11,355 --> 00:43:13,624 blame the captain's string of errors on his 815 00:43:13,691 --> 00:43:16,794 diminished psychological state. 816 00:43:16,860 --> 00:43:20,864 The IAC recommends that Flydubai provide better training 817 00:43:20,931 --> 00:43:23,400 on the manual operation of stabilizer trim, 818 00:43:23,467 --> 00:43:28,072 so their pilots don't make the same mistake again. 819 00:43:28,138 --> 00:43:31,709 Research into human factors, including situations like this 820 00:43:31,775 --> 00:43:33,844 where disorientation likely occurred, 821 00:43:33,911 --> 00:43:37,414 is at the forefront of aviation safety research. 822 00:43:37,481 --> 00:43:41,652 We are training our pilots on simulators to experience 823 00:43:41,719 --> 00:43:43,921 these illusions before they experience them in the air, 824 00:43:43,988 --> 00:43:46,490 so they can recognize those situations. 825 00:43:49,593 --> 00:43:53,597 I think the Flydubai accident shows how quickly 826 00:43:53,664 --> 00:43:56,567 your senses can overtake you. 827 00:43:56,633 --> 00:43:59,103 And one of the key lessons is for pilots 828 00:43:59,169 --> 00:44:04,341 to trust in their instruments, to take a step back from what 829 00:44:04,408 --> 00:44:06,944 they may think they're experiencing, 830 00:44:07,011 --> 00:44:10,514 to actually understand what the airplane is doing. 831 00:44:10,581 --> 00:44:13,450 You've got to keep the aeroplane flying.